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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
questions unanswered, not the least of which is whether this stan-
dard will apply uniformly to all public figures. It should be noted that
Butts, while a public figure in one sense, had not "thrust himself
into the vortex" of public controversy. Contrasted to this, General
Walker had voluntarily involved himself in a public controversy
by going to the University of Mississippi and speaking to the rioters.
In a great majority of the cases decided prior to Butts in which
the courts were willing to extend the New York Times rule to public
figures, these public figures had voluntarily involved themselves in
major public issues. Thus where a Nobel prize winning professor
had publicly advocated the cessation of nuclear testing, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals by dictum held him subject to the actual
malice rule. 9 On the other hand courts have been unwilling to
extend the constitutional protection where the plaintiff was not
involved in important public issues. °
It is purely subjective speculation to state that the Court intends
the reckless disregard test to be different for different types of
public figures. Yet the fact that such speculation can be rationally
made is strong evidence of the confusing nature of this decision.
In any event it is reasonable to conclude that the Court failed to
adhere to the reasoning of the Chief Justice that "differentiation
between 'public figures' and 'public officials' and adoption of sep-
arate standards of proof for each have no basis in law, logic, or
First Amendment policy,"41 because the Court in Butts ostensibly
did apply a different standard of proof than that applied to public
officials.
JAMEs R. CARPENTER, JR.
Constitutional Law-Procedural Due Process-Extension to the
High School Disciplinary Proceeding
In Madera v. Board of Education,' the Federal District Court
for the Southern District of New York held the due process clause
"Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir.
1966) (dictum); accord, Walker v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times
Co., 246 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Ky. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 368 F.2d
189 (6th Cir. 1966).
" Dempsey v. Time, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 754, 252 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Sup. Ct.
1964); accord, Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649 (D.C.
Cir. 1966).
" 388 U.S. at 163.
'267 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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of the fourteenth amendment applicable to a high school suspension
hearing. The plaintiff, a 14 year old pupil, was suspended from
his school. The incident which precipitated his suspension was not
stated in the opinion. His parents were notified that a "guidance
conference" would be held regarding the suspension. An attorney
was obtained by the parents but was advised that attorneys are not
permitted to attend the conference under General Circular No. 16
of the New York City School Board.2 The court found it had
jurisdiction to enjoin the use of this provision under 42 U.S.C.
Section 19833 and issued an injunction primarily because of the
drastic consequences which could result from this apparently inno-
cent, child-oriented guidance conference. Any one of the follow-
ing could happen to Victor Madera: (1) loss of his personal liberty
by being involuntarily incarcerated by the district superintendent of
schools ;4 (2) temporary expulsion; (3) permanent expulsion; (4)
his being sent to a special day school for socially maladjusted pu-
pils.5 Moreover, his parents might have an action brought against
them in a child neglect proceeding.' With particular reference to
these grave consequences the court specifically held that "enforce-
ment by defendants of the 'no attorneys provision' of Circular No.
16 deprives plaintiffs of their right to a hearing in a state initiated
proceeding which puts in jeopardy the minor plaintiff's liberty and
right to attend public schools." 7
Madera limits its discussion to the right to counsel issue. Per-
2 General Circular No. 16 (1965-66) of the New York City School
Board provides: "Inasmuch as this is a guidance conference for the purpose
of providing an opportunity for parents, teachers, counselors, supervisors,
et al., to plan educationally for the benefit of the child, attorneys seeking to
represent the parent or child may not participate." 267 F. Supp. at 358.
242 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) provides: "Every person who, under color of
any statute ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage... subjects... any
citizen. .. to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities se-
cured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable for redress to the party
injured... at law... in equity, or other proper proceeding. . ."
'The defendant school authorities under N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 3214 (Mc-
Kinney 1953), can confine a pupil in any private school, orphan's home, or
similar institution or with other private agencies provided they have the
written consent of the parents. If the parents refuse to "consent" in writing,
they "shall" be proceeded against for violating their statutory duty to see
to the pupil's attendance at school. N.Y. EDuc. LAW, §§ 3205, 3212, 3214
(McKinney 1953) (emphasis added); See also, N.Y. FAmLY CT. ACT, §§
312, 332, 335, 337 (McKinney 1963).
'267 F. Supp. at 366-69.
N.Y. FAmILY CT. AcT, §§ 312, 332, 335, 337 (McKinney 1963).
'267 F. Supp. at 369.
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haps courts in future high school disciplinary cases will be con-
fronted with other procedural due process rights in situations which
involve involuntary incarceration or permanent withdrawal of the
right to attend a public school. The fundamental fairness of the high
school disciplinary proceeding will be in issue. Since there is little
authority in this area, these courts, confronted with the problem
of what procedural standards should apply to meet the fairness test,
may look outside the high school hearing to other disciplinary pro-
ceedings that involve similar situations and consequences. If the
consequence of the proceeding involves incarceration, the courts
may turn to the juvenile proceeding for procedural guidelines. If
the only consequence of the high school hearing is permanent ex-
pulsion, the court may find relevant those procedural safeguards
granted to college students.
The law relating to college expulsions within the last decade
found itself in transition as it mirrored the changing character of
academic freedom 8 National attention recently focused on college
student disciplinary proceedings arising from political expressions
through peace demonstrations9 and academic expressions through
'A partial bibliography of materials treating due process and college
student disciplinary proceedings follows: T. E. BLACxWELL, COLLEGE LAW
(1961); Blackwell, Can a Student Be Expelled Without Due Process?,
COLLEGE AND UNIv. BUSINESS 31 (1961); Jacobson, The Expulsion of Stu-
dents and Due Process of Law, 34 J. HIGHER EDUC. 250 (1963); Seavy,
Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70 HARv. L. REv. 1406 (1957); Van
Alstyne, Procedural Due Process and State University Students, 10 U.C.L.A.
L. RaV. 368 (1963); Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom, 2 L. IN
TANS. Q. 1 (1965); Comment, Procedural Limitations on the Expulsion of
College and University Students, 10 ST. Louis U. L.J. 542 (1966); Note,
The College Student and Due Process in Disciplinary Proceedings, 1962
ILL. L.F. 438; Note, Judicial Review-Procedural Due Process in Student
Disciplinary Proceedings, 42 N.C.L. REV. 152 (1965); Note, Expulsion of
College and Professional Students-Rights and Remedies, 38 NOTRE DAME
LAW 174 (1963); Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 903 (1958); 55 Am. JuR. Universi-
ties and Colleges § 22 (1946); 14 C.J.S. Colleges and Universities § 26
(1939). The following concern the changing character of academic freedom:
Williamson, Do Students Have Academic Freedom?, COLLEGE AND UNIV.
BUSINESS 466 (1964); Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom, 2 L. IN
TRANS. Q. 1 (1965); NATIONAL STUDENT AsSOcIATION, CODIFICATION or
POLICY (1961); AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ACADEMIC FREEDOM
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OF STUDENTS IN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSIIFS (1961),
reprinted in 48 AM. Ass'N UNIV. PROFESSORS BULL. 110 (1962).
0 Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967). This case
held "that the student plaintiffs had no constitutional, statutory, or contractual
right to a notice of charges and a hearing before they could be expelled ......
Id. at 614. The holding was based upon Howard University being a private
rather than a public institution. The fourteenth amendment appears to apply
only to state financed universities, but as due process expands so does the
[Vol. 46
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editorials. 0 In the early cases the main issue was whether the uni-
versity had complied with its side of the bargain with the student
as manifested through its catalogue and bulletins. This issue was
usually decided in favor of the university because its rules and
charter showed it had committed itself to very little.1 Numerous
rationales were given for denying due process to students."2 The
area of state action. See, e.g., Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ.,
203 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La. 1962); Abernathy, Expansion of the State
Action Concept Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 375
(1958); Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 1083
(1960); Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REv. 3 (1961).
As college level education is being recognized as a fundamental interest and
as private universities use more public subsidies, these private universities
will be circumvented by more constitutional restraints. Van Alstyne, Pro-
vedural Due Process and State University Students, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
368, 388 (1963) ; see also, Miller, An Affirmative Thrust to Due Process of
Law?, 30 GEO. WASHa. L. REV. 399, 413-16 (1962).
" Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., Civil No. 2593-N (M.D. Ala.
Sept. 8, 1967). This court ruled that a state-supported college may not
promulgate "unreasonable rules and regulations" that restrict academic or
political expression by students.
" See Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom, 2 L. in TRANS. Q. 1,
8 n.24 (1965), for numerous cases on this point.
" A classic statement of the rationale for denying due process is that
found in the college catalogue which the student contracts to follow upon
admittance. The Syracuse University catalogue of 1928 was a typical exam-
ple of this. Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 489, 231 N.Y.
Supp. 435, 438 (1928); Annot. 58 A.L.R.2d 903, 913 (1958). For a modern
example of this see Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C.
1967), where the Howard University catalogue explained the relation be-
tween the University and its students as follows: "Attendance at Howard
University is a privilege. In order to protect its standards of scholarship
and character, the University reserves the right, and the student concedes
to the University the right, to deny admission to and to require the with-
drawal of any student at any time for any reason deemed sufficient to the
University. . . ... Id. at 613. Another rationale is the in loco parentis
argument which justifies summary discipline because the university is dealing
with "legal infants," whose collective welfare has to be safeguarded from
contamination by undesirable elements. Van Alstyne, Procedural Due
Process and State University Students, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 368, 376 (1963).
How can this rationale be valid when almost all entering students are at
least eighteen which is legal adulthood for many purposes, and the average
age, including graduate students, is above twenty-two? U.S. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, SERIES P-20, 110 CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, POPULA-
TION CHARACTERISTICS 12 (July 24, 1961). Another rationale stresses
that only the wealthiest institutions can afford the legally trained per-
sonnel that would be required if full due process rights are given. Koblitz
v. Western Reserve Univ., 21 Ohio C.C.R. 144, 11 Ohio C.C. Dec. 515
(1901). Another rationale states that the college does not have the
authority to fulfill the responsibility, i.e., the president cannot compel
witnesses to attend the hearing or testify. State ex rel. Ingersoll v.
Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 263 P. 433, cert. denied, 277 U.S. 591 (1928). "It
certainly cannot be maintained that it [student disciplinary proceeding]
means a hearing like that which constitutes the trial of a chancery suit,...
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basic question whether due process rights were available to college
students finally culminated in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of
Education" and Knight v. State Board of Education.4 These cases
specifically grounded federal jurisdiction in state college student
expulsion cases on the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. 5 Dixon was the first to hold that due process requires notice
and some opportunity to be heard before a student at a tax sup-
ported college can be expelled.'" The rationale of these cases was
the importance attached to a public education. In Dixon, the court
felt that "without sufficient education the plaintiffs would not be
able to earn an adequate livelihood, to enjoy life to the fullest, or
to fulfill as completely as possible the duties and responsibilities of
good citizens."': In Knight, the court concurred with the Dixon
holding that the right to attend school was not a mere privilege but
a constitutional right.' In effect, the right to an education is the
opportunity to succeed in life.
To protect that right it is now settled that dismissal from a state
university or college without the semblance of a hearing would vio-
late procedural due process.'" The next consideration is what this
for there is no power vested in the president of the university to compel the
attendance of witnesses or force them to testify if they were in attendance."
Id. at 213, 263 P. at 436.
23 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1962). The
case has been extensively noted: 14 ALA. L. REv. 126 (1961); 50 GEo. L.J.
314 (1961); 75 HARv. L. REv. 1429 (1962); 60 Micn. L. REv. 499 (1962);
15 VAND. L. Rxv. 1005 (1962).
14200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
15 Cases cited notes 13, 14 supra. See also, In re Carter, 262 N.C. 360,
137 S.E.2d 150 (1964), a recent North Carolina case which held that a
student expelled from the University of North Carolina was entitled to
judicial review under the state statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-306 to -316
(1953) ; Note, Judicial Review-Procedural Due Process in Student Disciplin-
ary Proceedings, 43 N.C.L. REv. 152 (1965).
18294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1962).
7 Id. at 157.
"' "[T]he fact remains that it [college education] is an interest of almost
incalculable value .... Private interests are to be evaluated under the due
process clause... not in terms of labels or fictions, but in terms of their
true significance and worth." 200 F. Supp. at 178.
1" Cases cited notes 13, 14 supra. See also, Woods v. Wright, 334 F.2d
369 (5th Cir. 1964). "Dismissal from college affects a student's life too
drastically to be left to even the barest possibility of arbitrary action by
college administrators. Expulsion carries with it an ineradicable stigma
which usually prevents admission to another institution, with the result that
a student's chances for higher education may be gone forever." Jacobson,




hearing that deprives a student of his right to an education should
encompass. Madera, involving possible incarceration or expulsion,
limited itself to the right to counsel issue. Should the right to
counsel be one procedural due process right granted to the high
school disciplinary proceeding? In Matter of Goldwyn,2" on June
27, 1967, the court held that the Department of Education acting
solely on the principal's letter could not suspend a high school stu-
dent's examination privileges without a hearing at which she could
defend herself with the assistance of counsel.21 In areas outside
the educational cases, courts have stressed the importance of the
right to counsel at a hearing. In Powell v. Alabama,22 the court
held that one of the basic components of a hearing in a criminal
case was the right to counsel, and a denial of that right would be
denial of a hearing.23 In administrative proceedings which are
purely investigatory rather than adjudicative in nature, there is no
general right to counsel.24 But if there is a right to a hearing as a
matter of procedural due process, i.e., if there is a constitutionally
protected right,25 then denial of counsel may result in the hearing's
failure to meet the test of fairness.26 The right to be represented
by counsel is presently regarded as an essential element of our sys-
tem of criminal justice.2 7 Thus, the right to a hearing to meet the
constitutional standard of fairness requires the right to counsel, if
desired. This conclusion gives strength to the holding in Madera
on the right to counsel issue.
What other procedural rights should encompass the high school
suspension hearing besides the right to counsel? Obviously more
than the right to counsel is involved. One commentator argued
for the full panoply of procedural safeguards:
20 157 N.Y.L.J. 17 (Super. Ct. Queens County, June 27 1967). For a
discussion of the case see TIME, July 14, 1967 at 41; 9 WEL. L. BUuL. 2
(July 1967).
157 N.Y.L.J. 17
2.287 U.S. 45 (1932).
23 Id. at 68-69.
" Bowles v. Baer, 142 F.2d 787 (7th Cir. 1944), noted in 58 CoLum.
L. REV. 395 (1958). See also, Rauh & Pollitt, Right to and Nature of
Representation Before Congressional Committees, 45 MINN. L. Rav. 853
(1961).
"See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Kennedy, 256 Ala. 478, 55 So.2d 511
(1951); Almon v. Morgan County, 245 Ala. 241, 16 So.2d 511 (1944) (due
process contemplates representation by counsel if desired).
-Hyun v. Landon, 219 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1955), aff'd, 350 U.S. 990
(1956).
27 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
19681
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
When we proudly contrast the full hearings before our courts
with those in the benighted countries which have no due process
protection, when many of our courts are so careful in the pro-
tection of those charged with crimes. . . , our sense of justice
should be outraged by denial to students of the normal safe-
guards. It is shocking that the officials of a state educational
institution. . should not understand the elementary principles
of fair play. It is equally shocking to find that a court supports
them in denying to a student the protection given to a pick-
pocket.
28
Dixon sets forth a model of the procedural rights that should be
given to the college student disciplinary proceeding, following the
tone of the above comment. The court in Dixon stated that there
must be advance notice to the student which should "contain a
statement of the specific charges and grounds which, if proven,
would justify expulsion. . "..",0 The hearing should allow presen-
tation of both sides of the case in considerable detail.8 0 Although
cross-examination is not required, the student should be given the
names of the witnesses against him and a report of their testimony."M
He should be allowed to present his own defense and to present oral
testimony or written affidavits of witnesses in his behalf.8"
The courts facing the problem of what procedural standards
should apply to high school hearings could stop with the college
cases and conclude by analogy that the right to a hearing, the right
to counsel, and the model of procedural safeguards outlined in
Dixon should apply equally to the student expelled from high school.
Nevertheless, there appears to be something inherently different
between high school and college. Colleges are more selective and
optional; only the qualified can be admitted. High schools are open
to everyone, and compulsory in that society desires that everyone
should attend high school. Courts may look beyond the college cases
because of this distinction and the additional factor that involun-
tary incarceration may result from the high school hearing either
directly as in Madera or indirectly by referral from the school pro-
ceeding to the juvenile court. Thus the courts may look to the
juvenile courts for guidance for the high school proceeding. In-
2" Seavy, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70 HAv. L. Rav. 1406-
07 (1957).






deed, it may be that high school suspension whether there is possible
incarceration or not is so different from the college suspension that
the analogy to the juvenile court procedural rights should always be
considered.
The theory behind a juvenile court proceeding and a high school
guidance conference is essentially the same, i.e., rehabilitation. Both
seek to formulate what will be best for the child so that he will
be a positive rather than a negative factor to society's interests.
The juvenile is made "to feel that he is the object of [the State's]
care and solicitude," 33 so the proceedings are not adversary but
the state is proceeding as parens patriae.34 Nevertheless, there is
presently little disagreement that the due process clause has a part
in these hearings.3 In Kent v. United States, 6 the United States
Supreme Court, regarding the juvenile court statute which was
ambiguous on this point, said:
there is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of
such tremendous consequences without ceremony, without hear-
ing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement
of reasons. . . [T]he hearing must measure up to the essentials
of due process and fair treatment.
3 8
On May 15, 1967, the Supreme Court of the United States (For-
tas, J.), relying in part upon the Report of the President's Com-
mission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice,3 9
reiterated the above quote, and specifically held for constitutional
reasons in In re Gault4" that a juvenile has right to notice of the
charges,41 to counsel,42 to confrontation and cross-examination of
" Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HAgv. L. REv. 104, 120 (1909).
,Id. at 109.
Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 387
(1961); Gardner, The Kent Case and the Juvenile Court, 52 A.B.A.J. 923
(1966); Ketcham, The Legal Renaissance in the Juvenile Court, 60 Nw.
U.L. REv. 585 (1965); Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN.
L. REv. 547 (1957); Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts,
67 COLUm. L. REv. 281 (1967); Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police,
State Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 HARv. L. REv. 775 (1966).
80383 U.S. 541 (1966).
17 Id. at 554.
I Id. at 562.
"PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, at 55-56,
78, 80-81, 84-87 (1967). [hereinafter cited as PRESmENT'S COMMISSION]
,o 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967).
Id. at 1446.
"Id. at 1451. See also, Lehman, A Juvenile's Right to Counsel in a
Delinquency Hearing, 17 JUVENILE CT. JUDGE'S JoURNAL 53 (1966); The
1968]
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witnesses, 43 and to the privilege against self-incrimination.4 In
granting these procedural due process rights to juveniles, the Court
felt that recent reports45 suggest "that the appearance as well as
actuality of fairness, impartiality and orderliness-in short, the
essentials of due process may be a more impressive and more thera-
peutic attitude so far as the juvenile is concerned." 40
It would seem that if appropriate due process is followed in
high school expulsions the student will similarly feel he is being
treated fairly and will respond to the decisions of the board more
readily. Denver Judge Rubin at a recent meeting of National
Council of Juvenile Court Judges echoed this sentiment:
The present system, which shuns the adversary system and pre-
fers flexible and informal deliberations, denies consistent legal
protection to the child. As a result, the child does not understand
himself or the system. By incorporation of Constitutional safe-
guards into this system, individualized justice can become a
reality.
4 7
Similarly the informal high school hearing denies consistent legal
protection in that its actions may be arbitrary or cursory. What the
appropriate due process rights given to the high school student are
will depend on the jurisdiction and the possible consequences of the
disciplinary hearing. If the only outcome of the hearing would
be expulsion, temporary or permanent, perhaps the college cases
alone should apply. If college and high school are regarded as fun-
damentally and inherently different, then perhaps the procedural
safeguards laid down in Gault are applicable. When numerous
drastic consequences could result as in Madera, a high school stu-
President's Crime Commission felt "that no single action holds more po-
tential for achieving procedural justice for the child in the juvenile court
than provision of counsel." PRESIDENT'S COmIsSION 86.
"87 S. Ct. at 1459.
,87 S. Ct. at 1458. The Supreme Court of the United States has broadly
applied the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be compelled to be
a witness against himself when he is threatened with deprivation of his
liberty. "The privilege can be claimed in any proceeding, be it criminal or
civil, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory." Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964); accord, Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1 (1964).
"IF. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 19 (1964); The
President's Crime Commission concluded: "There is increasing evidence
that the informal procedures... may . . . engender in the child a sense of
injustice provoked by seemingly all-powerful and changeless exercise of
authority. . . ." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION 85.
"87 S. Ct. at 1443.4?TIME, August 4, 1967 at 68.
[Vol. 46
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dent facing an expulsion hearing should be given those procedural
due process rights granted to the college student and to the juvenile.
Both society and the student will benefit if some procedural safe-
guards are granted to the high school suspension hearing rather
than arbitrary procedural laxness.
ERIC MILLS HOLMES
Criminal Law-Sentencing-Denial of Credit for Time
Served or Longer Sentence Imposed at Retrial
In Patton v. North Carolina1 Eddie W. Patton was tried in the
Superior Court of North Carolina for armed robbery in October,
1960. He was unrepresented by counsel and entered a plea of nolo
contendere at the close of the state's evidence. He was convicted,
received a sentence of twenty years and did not appeal. However,
after serving nearly five years in prison, he applied for a state post-
conviction hearing which resulted in a new trial based on the denial
of his constitutional right to counsel at the first trial. Represented
by counsel at the second trial in February, 1965, Patton pleaded not
guilty and was convicted by a jury on the original indictment charg-
ing armed robbery. The trial judge purported to give Patton credit
for the nearly five years served on the original twenty year sentence
and then sentenced him to twenty years imprisonment.
The effect of this sentence is an increased punishment. Had he
not appealed Patton would have been eligible for parole in October,
1965. If he had not been paroled, and without taking earned time
factors into account, he would have completed the first sentence in
October, 1980. As a result of the sentence at the second trial, Pat-
ton will not be eligible for parole until February, 1970, and the
sentence will not terminate until February, 1985. Because he ob-
tained a new trial, Patton will remain in prison five years longer
than if he had not asserted his right to seek a fair trial.
After the second trial, Patton applied to the federal district
court for a writ of habeas corpus. The writ was granted2 and
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
1381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967).
2 Patton v. North Carolina, 256 F. Supp. 225 (W.D.N.C. 1966) ; noted in
1966 DuICE L.J. 1172; 80 HA~v. L. Rlv. 891 (1967); 20 VAND. L. REv.
660 (1967); 12 VIL. L. REv. 380 (1967). See generally Van Alstyne, In
Gideon's Wake: Harsher Penalties and the "Successf d" Crirninai Appellant,
74 YALE L.J. 606 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Van Alstyne].
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